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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Petitioner/Appellant. ] 
v. ] 
Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger ] 
and Tonya Althoff, ] 
Respondents/Appellees. ) 
) CaseNos. 20040745-SC 
) 20050269-SC 
) Ct. App. Nos. 20030494-CA 
) 20030373-CA 
i Priority 
JOINT BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§78-2-2(3)(a), and UT. R. APP. P. 45. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that Monticello Police 
Chief Kent Adair testified as an expert when he stated that 
methamphetamine users generally possess only a quarter- to half gram 
and do not possess scales or baggiesy which are generally used by drug 
distributors for repackaging and selling or larger drug quantities? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, not the decision of the trial court, for correctness and examines the Court of 
Appeals' decision to determine whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review. See, State v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, [^4, 
— P.3d — (August 5,2005); Hansen v. Evre. 2005 UT 29, f8,116 P.3d 290. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Art. I § 7 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amends. V and XIV § 1 
UTR.EVID. 701 
UT. R. EVID. 702 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 24,2002, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger ("Rothlisberger") and Tonya 
Althoff ("Althoff') were traveling in a car driven by Althoff returning to Moab, Utah, from 
a road trip they had been on to Arizona (Tr.1 at p. 50). Officer Jim Eberling ("Eberling") 
effectuated a traffic stop of the vehicle for improper lane travel, then released Althoff. Id. at 
p. 72. Upon returning to his vehicle, Eberling was informed by dispatch that the plates on 
Althoff s vehicle were expired. Id. at p. 51. Eberling effectuated a second stop approximately 
1 V2 blocks from the first. Id. at pp. 52, 72. 
After requesting Althoff s license and registration, Eberling was informed that her 
driver's license was suspended (Tr. at pp. 52-53,72,139). He placed Althoff under arrest and 
1
 The transcripts in Althoff and Rothlisbergers' cases are identical and each record 
contains a copy; although the transcripts are not paginated in the record index for Rothlisberger's 
case. Therefore, the citations contained herein to the transcripts pertain to the Althoff record at 
141. 
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conducted a search of the vehicle incident to the arrest. Id. Eberling located a small baggy 
of a white substance on the console between the two front seats. Id. at pp. 53, 64, 73, 98. 
Chief Kent Adair ("Adair") arrived to assist and Eberling placed Rothlisberger under arrest 
for possession of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 54-55, 80, 83. 
The vehicle was moved to an abandoned service station, where the two officers 
continued searching the vehicle (Tr. at pp. 55, 74, 76-77, 80, 83-84). Adair located a large 
bag of methamphetamine in a toilet paper roll in the passenger door, and a snort bottle-
containing only residue of methamphetamine-in a pair of men's pants that was located in the 
passenger door panel. Id at pp. 56-58,60, 64, 74, 84-86, 93, 97-99,100-101; Exhibits 1, 5, 
6 and 9. Rothlisberger claimed the pants and the snort bottle as his. Id. at p. 87. Althoff 
claimed the methamphetamine as hers and stated that Rothlisberger knew nothing about it. 
Id. at pp. 61, 69, 71, 95. Eberling found a gym bag in the back seat, which Althoff claimed 
as hers and which contained a wooden box. Id. at pp. 59, 62-63, 69, 71. The wooden box 
contained scales, which had white residue on them, and several baggies. Id. at 59; Exhibits 
7 and 8. 
On September 26, 2002, Rothlisberger and Althoff were charged by Information 
regarding the incident. Rothlisberger was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance 
With Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
Class B Misdemeanor (Rothlisberger R0001-R0002). Althoff was simultaneously charged, 
but those charges were later amended on December 13, 2002, to include Possession of a 
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Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony; Driving With 
Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body, a class B misdemeanor; Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, 
a class B misdemeanor; and Failure by New Owner to Secure New Registration and New 
Certificate of Title, a class C misdemeanor (Althoff R0001-R0004; R0025-R0027). 
On February 11,2003, Rothlisberger and Althoff were found guilty on all charges (Tr. 
at pp. 173-174). On May 5,2003, Rothlisberger appeared for sentencing before the trial court 
and was sentenced to a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years on the felony, and six (6) months 
on the misdemeanor (Rothlisberger RO 115-R0117). On May 21,2003, the trial court entered 
its Judgment and Order ofProbation (the "Rothlisberger Judgment"). Id. On June 6,2003, 
Rothlisberger timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Rothlisberger Judgment 
(Rothlisberger R0118-R0119). 
On April 7, 2003, Althoff appeared for sentencing before the trial court and was 
sentenced to a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years on the felony charge, six (6) months each 
in the San Juan County Jail on the class B misdemeanor charges, and ninety (90) days in the 
San Juan County Jail on the class C misdemeanor charge, all to be served concurrently 
(Althoff R0129-R0130). On April 8,2003, the trial court entered its Judgment and Order of 
Commitment to Utah State Prison (the "Althoff Judgment"). Id. On April 25,2003, Althoff 
timely filed her Notice of Appeal from the Althoff Judgment (Althoff P.0136-R0137). 
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After briefing and oral argument, on July 1,2004, the Utah Court of Appeals entered 
its Opinion reversing Rothlisberger's conviction of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute and remanded the matter for a new trial (the "Rothlisberger Opinion"). 
See, Addendum "A." On or about September 1,2004, the State of Utah filed its Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals [sic] (the "Rothlisberger Petition") alleging 
that the Utah Court of Appeals had decided an important question of state law which has not 
been, but should be settled by this Court. 
On November 24,2004, this Court granted the Rothlisberger Petition and set the matter 
for briefing. On February 17,2005, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed Althoff s conviction 
on the same issue as in the Rothlisberger Opinion. See, Addendum "B." On March 3,2005, 
the State filed its opening brief with this Court in the appeal pertaining to the Rothlisberger 
Petition. On March 21,2005, the State filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari (the "Althoff 
Petition") with this Court in the Althoff case, challenging the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion 
on the same issue as in the Rothlisberger Petition. 
On May 4, 2005, the State filed its motion to consolidate the Althoff Petition and 
Rothlisberger Petition. On May 5, 2005, Rothlisberger filed his motion to stay the briefing 
pending determination of the motion to consolidate. On June 1,2005, this Court granted the 
Althoff Petition. On June 6, 2005, this Court granted the State's motion to consolidate and 
Rothlisberger's motion to stay pending a briefing schedule in Althoff. In its June 6, 2005, 
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Order, this Court determined that Rothlisberger and Althoff s appellee's briefs would be filed 
simultaneously in this matter. 
Rothlisberger and Althoff have filed a separate motion with this Court to allow them 
to file this joint brief in this matter rather than separate appellee's briefs based on the fact that 
the issue on appeal in each of their cases is identical, as are the facts of the case as they pertain 
to the issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 2,2002, Althoff and Rothlisberger appeared before the Seventh Judicial 
District Court, for their preliminary hearing (Rothlisberger R0214). At the preliminary 
hearing, Eberling testified that he believed the quantity of drugs found in the door panel2, 
when taken with the scale and baggies found in Althoff s gym bag, were likely intended for 
distribution. Id. at pp. 18-19. Although Adair also testified at the preliminary hearing 
regarding his participation in the arrest, he did not offer any testimony regarding the 
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine found in the door panel. Id. at pp. 37-44. 
2
 The Utah Court of Appeals mistakenly indicates throughout the Opinion that the large 
quantity of drugs was found in Respondent's pants; however, the transcripts of the hearing and 
testimony elicited thereat clearly show that the large quantity of drugs was found in a toilet paper 
roll in the passenger side door panel. There was some confusion since Respondent's pants were 
also in the door panel; however, Respondent's pants were removed from the door panel by Adair 
when the vehicle was being moved to the abandoned service station. See, Transcripts at p. 97. 
After Eberling's extensive search of the vehicle at the abandoned service station, Adair 
approached and assisted him and only then located the toilet paper roll in the door panel Id. at 
p. 56, 65, 74, 85, 98-99; Trial Exhibit " 1 " at p. 2, and Exhibits "5" and "6." 
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At trial, however, the prosecutor did not elicit Eberling's opinion regarding the 
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine found in the door panel. Instead, questions 
regarding the significance of the quantity were now directed toward Adair (Tr. at at p. 90-92). 
The following colloquies occurred during Adair's direct examination: 
Q: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in your experience to look or see how 
methamphetamine is usually packaged as far as—when you have found 
methamphetamine in your experience, have you found times when people have 
had personal use amounts? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity? 
A: A quarter or half grams, right in there. Maybe even at the most a gram. 
Q: Do you have-through your training and experience, do you know commonly 
what somebody would buy if they were to go out on the street buy some right 
now, what would they usually get for personal use? 
A: I don't understand the question. What do you mean what would they usually 
get? 
Q: Well, if I-
A: Are you talking the quantity? 
Q: Yes. 
A: In our undercover investigations when we buy from individuals, we usually 
buy a quarter or a half a gram. 
Q: Have you ever found in your experience that someone who had personal 
quantities of methamphetamine to have scales? 
A: It's not common, no. 
Rothlisberger's trial attorney objected to Adair's testimony, arguing that it should be 
deemed expert testimony under UT. R. EVID. 702 and, accordingly, that admission of that 
expert testimony was improper because the State had not given the defense thirty-days' notice 
of the expert testimony as required by as required by UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 (2003). 
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Althoff s trial attorney joined in the objection. The trial court overruled the objection, ruling 
that Chief Adair's testimony was admissible as lay witness testimony under UT. R. EVID. 701. 
On June 16,2003, Rothlisberger filed his Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause and 
Memorandum in Support (the "First Motion") in the Seventh Judicial District Court. On July 
3, 2003, Honorable Lyle R. Anderson denied the First Motion. On July 14, 2003, 
Rothlisberger filed his Motion to Set Aside Order, Renew Motion for Certificate of Probable 
Cause, and Strike Hearing (the "Second Motion"). On July 29, 2003, Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson entered the court's Ruling on Renewed Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause, 
denying the Second Motion, indicating that the trial court believed the testimony "...to be 
neither expert testimony nor lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual 
experiences." Rothlisberger R0212. 
After consideration of the parties briefs and oral arguments, the Utah Court of Appeals 
held that (1) Adair's trial testimony regarding the significance of amount of methamphetamine 
found was expert testimony; (2) Respondent did not waive his right to challenge the admission 
of expert testimony by failing to request a continuance; and (3) the State failed to provide 
proper notice to defendant of testimony of officer who was expert witness. See, Addendum 
"A." Based upon these findings, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed Rothlisberger's 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and remanded the 
matter for a new trial. 
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Several months later, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its decision in the Althoff 
case stating that "Althoff s arrest, conviction, and appeal mirror those of her companion at the 
time of her arrest, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger." See, Addendum "B." It found that Althoff 
presented identical issues central to the decision in the Rothlisberger Opinion and reversed 
Althoff s convictions and remanded her case for a new trial on that basis. Id 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that evidence on the 
significance of the amount of drug possessed is specialized and not within the purview of a 
typical juror's knowledge, thereby requiring an "expert" to testify to provide the jurors with 
the knowledge necessary to the understanding. U.S.v.Muldrow, 19F.3d 1332,1338(C.A.10 
(Kan.),1994) citing United States v. McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 502 
U.S. 897,112 S.Ct. 270,116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991)("[a] person possessing no knowledge of the 
drug world would find the importance of [the amount possessed] impossible to 
understand...[t]he average juror would not know whether this quantity is a mere trace, or 
sufficient to pollute 1,000 people."). 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16(a)(5) states that "...the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request.. .any other item of evidence which the court determines 
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense." UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16(g) establishes the 
following: 
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If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention 
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit 
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other 
order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Utah courts have held that, under UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16, undisclosed 
expert testimony is properly excluded where expert witnesses or their testimonies are not 
disclosed by a certain date before trial to allow opposing parties to prepare for trial by 
deposing witnesses, planning for effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal 
testimony. See. Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-1024 (Utah 1994)(upholding 
exclusion of undisclosed rebuttal witness called to testify to reasonably anticipated defense); 
Hardy v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 925 (Utah App. 1989) (excluding expert's evidence because 
not timely provided to opposing party). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, in relevant part, states as follows: 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in 
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending 
to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable 
but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing, 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give 
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the 
opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the 
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent 
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substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing 
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
Upon a finding that a party failed to comply with the thirty day notice requirement of UTAH 
CODE ANN. §77-17-13(l)(a), subsection 4(a) requires the trial court to grant a continuance 
sufficient to prepare and meet the testimony. State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
The trial court erred by first not recognizing Adair as an expert, then by allowing Adair 
to testify as to the significance of the amount of drugs possessed and the uses of the drug 
paraphernalia found in the vehicle. This was in violation of both UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 16 and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 since Adair's testimony regarding these 
matters was never disclosed by the State and Adair was never designated as an expert witness. 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied the law to the facts of the cases and its 
determination should stand. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION 
SHOULD BE UPHELD 
A. THE TESTIMONY ITSELF REQUIRED AN EXPERT TO PRESENT IT, 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 702, sets forth that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise"(emphasis added). The 
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United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that evidence on the significance 
of the amount of drug possessed is specialized and not within the purview of a typical juror's 
knowledge, thereby requiring an "expert" to testify to provide the jurors with the knowledge 
necessary to the understanding. U.S. v. Muldrow. 19F.3d 1332,1338 (C.A. 10 (Kan.), 1994) 
citing United States v. McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.\ cert, denied, 502 U.S. 897,112 
S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991)("[a] person possessing no knowledge of the drug world 
would find the importance of [the amount possessed] impossible to understand... [t]he average 
juror would not know whether this quantity is a mere trace, or sufficient to pollute 1,000 
people.99). 
In United States v. McDonald, the trial court never formally accepted the police officer 
as an expert witness, but the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals assumed the witness was accepted 
as an expert witness by the trial court since the trial court heard the witness describe his 
qualifications, including his specialized knowledge, education, skills and experience, and then 
allowed the witness to give opinion testimony. McDonald at 1522, fn. 2; see also UTAHRULES 
OF EVIDENCE 702. At trial, the trial court in the instant matter never formally accepted Adair 
as an expert witness with respect to methamphetamine distribution and paraphernalia, stating 
only that he was testifying as a lay witness pursuant to Rule 701 of the UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE (Tr. at p. 105). In the trial court's ruling on the Second Motion, however, the trial 
court acknowledged that it had accepted Adair as a lay witness at the trial but that, upon 
review for the Second Motion, determined that the testimony was "...neither expert testimony 
12 
or [sic] lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual experience" 
(R0211-R0213; emphasis added). 
Adair's testimony was not the type of attestation a lay person could render. See, 
McDonald. The prosecutor even premised some of his questions by asking Adair to render 
an opinion "...through [his] training and experience..." as to what the typical distributional 
amount of methamphetamine was on the street and the uses of certain drug paraphernalia (Tr. 
at pp. 91-92; emphasis added). Additionally, the trial court had heard Adair describe his 
qualifications, including his specialized knowledge, education, skill and experience with 
respect to drug distribution and paraphernalia (Tr. at pp. 81 -83). Specifically, Adair testified 
as follows: 
BY MR. HALLS: 
Q. State your name and occupation. 
A. My name is Kent Adair, and I'm a police officer for Monticello City. 
Q. How long have you been a police officer? 
A. Twenty years. 
Q. What kind of training did you have before you became a police officer? 
A. I went to the police academy. 
Q. Have you taken or had some training in drug intervention, (inaudible) drugs, 
that kind of thing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has it required that you keep up some kind of a certification by taking seminars 
on a yearly basis? 
A. We have to have 40 hours annual training. 
Q. Have you done that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that for the last 20 years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many drug cases do you think you have worked in that 20 years? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. So-
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A. Myself or been involved in? 
Q. Okay, let's go with been involved in. Give me [sic] estimate, if you can. 
A. I don't know, I'd say a hundred, probably. 
Q. Do you supervise anyone in your department that works with the Grand San 
Juan County Drug Task Force? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you been involved in cases that involve methamphetamine? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you familiar or do you know from your training and experience—well, I'm 
going to wait a few minutes to ask you that... 
Id. Based on this information concerning Adair's specialized knowledge, education, skills 
and experience, the trial court allowed Adair to testify as to the significance of the amount 
possessed, hence it is assumed Adair was accepted as an expert witness by the trial court. 
McDonald at 1522, fn. 2. 
In U.S.v.Markum. the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[experience alone can 
qualify a witness to give expert testimony." 4 F.3d 891 (C.A.10 (Okl.)1993); see, Farner v. 
Paccar. Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528-529 (8th Cir. 1977); Cunningham v. Gains. 507 F.2d 496, 500 
(2nd Cir. 1974). In the instant matter, Adair was cross-examined extensively regarding his 
experience directly before he gave the testimony at issue. It is axiomatic that the prosecution 
elicited this "experience" testimony for the purpose of informing the jury as to Adair's 
expertise in the field so the jury could determine the reliability of his testimony. 
The State attempts to sidestep the requirements of expert notification by arguing that 
a police officer's experience is not within a realm of expertise. This position was that of the 
trial court, as stated in the Second Motion, that it did not believe it was expert or lay opinion 
testimony, but testimony based on Adair's experience. Experience, however, is the basis for 
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determining whether someone is an expert in their field. When coupled with the expert nature 
of the testimony at issue here, as argued further below, it is clear that the State intended Adair 
to offer testimony not within the purview of the typical juror's knowledge and is simply trying 
to sidestep the notification requirements. 
The trial court would not have allowed just anyone to offer this type of testimony 
without any foundation as to their experience. As evidenced by the trial court's ruling on the 
Second Motion, the trial court only allowed Adair to testify because of his experience. It did 
not have to be Chief Adair who gave the testimony. Anyone who could lay proper foundation 
for their knowledge gained through their experience could have testified as to this matter, but 
only after that experience showed that they could be an "expert" in the field and proper 
notification had been given to the opposing party. It is axiomatic that a trial court would not 
allow any person off the streets to offer this type of testimony because it is not within the 
purview of the average person's knowledge. 
The State focuses its argument completely on the idea that Adair testified simply based 
on his experience and was thus not an expert, but they fail to argue anything pertaining to 
whether the testimony specifically at issue herein itself requires an expert to give it. Each of 
the cases cited to by the State from various jurisdictions in its brief pertains to testimony other 
than the significance of the amount of drugs possessed and are thus distinguishable since this 
issue pertains specifically to this testimony. See, State's Althoff Brief at pp. 21-29; State's 
Rothlisberger brief at pp. 22-30. It is the testimony itself in this matter that is considered to 
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be "expert." As argued supra, our own 10th Circuit Court of Appeals specifically stated, and 
has long upheld, that the testimony respecting the significance of the quantity possessed 
requires an expert to give it. U.S. v. Muldrow. 19 F.3d 1332, 1338 (C.A.10 (Kan.),1994) 
citim United States v. McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 897,112 
S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991). 
Testimony regarding the significance of the drug possessed requires an expert to 
present it. Only after a determination as to whether the testimony requires an expert do we 
turn to whether the witness offering such testimony qualifies as an expert and whether the 
requirements under UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 AND UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 have been met. In 
the instant matter, however, the trial court erroneously found that the testimony did not require 
an expert and thus found that the requirements need not be met, violating Rothlisberger and 
Althoff s rights under UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 AND UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, as argued further 
below. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized this err and correctly reversed and remanded 
the Althoff and Rothlisberger's cases. 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY NOTIFY ROTHLISBERGER AND ALTHOFF 
UNDER UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 AND UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16(a)(5) states that "...the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request.. .any other item of evidence which the court determines 
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense." UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16(g) establishes the 
following: 
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If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention 
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit 
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other 
order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Utah courts have held that, under UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16, undisclosed 
expert testimony is properly excluded where expert witnesses or their testimonies are not 
disclosed by a certain date before trial to allow opposing parties to prepare for trial by 
deposing witnesses, planning for effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal 
testimony. See. Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-1024 (Utah 1994)(upholding 
exclusion of undisclosed rebuttal witness called to testify to reasonably anticipated defense); 
Hardy v. Hardv. 776 P.2d 917, 925 (Utah App. 1989) (excluding expert's evidence because 
not timely provided to opposing party). 
Where evidence is inculpatory, the prosecutor's discovery duty is limited to disclosures 
under Rule 16 of the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. State v. Rugebreet 965 P.2d 
518, 522 (Utah App. 1998). Whether prosecutors produce inculpatory evidence under court 
order or upon request, they have a duty to comply fully and forthrightly. Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that, when the prosecution makes a voluntary disclosure of 
inculpatory evidence to a defendant, the prosecution must produce all the requested material 
or identify those portions not disclosed. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913,916-17 (Utah 1987). 
In cases involving wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, the State has the burden 
of persuading the court that the error did not unfairly prejudice Appellant and there was no 
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reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial v/ould have been more 
favorable for Appellant. Id. at 921. 
At the trial in this matter, Appellant's trial counsel objected to Adair's testimony with 
respect to drug distribution amounts and paraphernalia (RO104-RO108). As established supra, 
Adair testified as an expert with respect to drug distribution amounts and paraphernalia; 
however, his expert testimony was not disclosed by the prosecution prior to the trial in this 
matter. Adair's testimony was inculpatory and, therefore, the prosecutor had a duty to 
disclose it fully and forthrightly to the defense under Rule 16. State v. Rugebregt. 965 P.2d 
518, 522 (Utah App. 1998). 
The State voluntarily disclosed to the defense that Adair would be called as a witness, 
designating him only as "Law Enforcement, assisting officer" on the witness list 
(Rothlisberger R0028); however, the State failed to produce all of the evidence when it failed 
to disclose that Adair would be testifying as an expert in drug distribution and paraphernalia. 
See. Knight at 916-17. 
Under objection from the defense and in violation of UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 16 and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, Adair testified as an undisclosed expert to 
the amount of methamphetamine considered to be a single dose and the uses of the drug 
paraphernalia found in the vehicle (Tr. at pp. 86-87, 90-92). The State's failure to disclose 
Adair's expert testimony to the defense prior to the trial in this matter denied Appellant the 
ability to plan for an effective cross-examination and obtain rebuttal testimony with respect 
18 
to Adair. The failure to disclose Adair's testimony as to the amount of methamphetamine per 
dose and the uses of the drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle was clearly a violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13. Given the fact that the State was charging Rothlisberger and 
Althoff with intent to distribute and Adair's expert testimony went directly towards that end, 
the State's violation of §77-17-13 was prejudicial to Rothlisberger and Althoff. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellees respectfully requests that this 
Court enter an order denying the State's Petition. 
DATED this day of , 2005. 
Barton J. Warren 
Counsel for Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger 
William L. Schultz 
Counsel for Tonya Althoff 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas Kevin ROTHLISBERGER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20030494-CA. 
July 1,2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
Seventh District Court, Monticello Department, 
Lyle R. Anderson, J., of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that: 
(1) officer's testimony regarding significance of 
amount of methamphetamine found was expert 
testimony; 
(2) defendant did not waive his right to challenge 
admission of expert testimony by failing to request 
continuance; and 
(3) State failed to provide proper notice to 
defendant of testimony of office who was expert 
witness. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, P.J., dissented. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €=>629(11) 
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases 
Police officer's testimony that amount of 
methamphetamine found was significant in that it 
was likely that large amount was intended for 
further sale was expert testimony in possession with 
intent to distribute prosecution, requiring State to 
give defendant 30 days notice of testimony; 
testimony was necessarily based on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 702; U.C.A.1953, 77-17-13(l)(a). 
[2] Criminal Law €==>478(1) 
110k478(l) Most Cited Cases 
When a witness seeks to testify regarding matters 
that are necessarily based on that witness's 
"scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge," 
that witness must be qualified as an expert under 
rule governing testimony of experts, and all 
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable 
statutory commands must then be followed with 
respect to that testimony. Rules of Evid., Rule 702. 
[3] Criminal Law €^478(1) 
110k478(l) Most Cited Cases 
Witnesses can be qualified as experts not only on 
the basis of formal educational training, but also on 
the basis of their own personal or vocational 
experiences. Rules of Evid., Rule 702. 
[4] Criminal Law €=>474.5 
110k474.5 Most Cited Cases 
[4] Criminal Law €=^478(1) 
110k478(l) Most Cited Cases 
Knowledge regarding the significance of a 
particular quantity of drug is beyond the realm of 
common experience for the common juror, and is 
accordingly the type of testimony that a witness 
could offer only if first qualified as an expert. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 702. 
[5] Criminal Law €==>1030(1) 
110kl030(l) Most Cited Cases 
Parties are not required to make futile objections in 
order to preserve a future claim. 
[6] Criminal Law €==>1036.6 
110kl036.6 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant did not waive his right to challenge 
admission of expert testimony by failing to request 
continuance, where trial court first erred by 
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concluding that challenged testimony was 
admissible as lay witness testimony, making any 
objection based on expert testimony rules futile. 
Rules ofEvid., Rule 702. 
[7] Criminal Law €==>629(11) 
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases 
A party who is seeking to offer expert testimony 
must first provide the other party with a copy of the 
expeifs name, address, and curriculum vitae; this 
clearly contemplates that the opposing party will 
have the opportunity to prepare for that expert's 
testimony in a witness-specific fashion. 
U.C.A.1953,77-17-13(l)(b). 
[8] Criminal Law €=^629(11) 
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases 
State failed to provide proper notice to defendant of 
testimony of police officer who was expert witness; 
although another officer offered testimony that was 
similar in content, officer did not testify as expert at 
preliminary hearing, and State did not provide 
defense with copy of officer's name, address, and 
curriculum vitae. U.C.A.1953, 77-17-13(5)(a). 
*1194 Barton J. Warren, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Brett J. Delporto 
, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before BENCH, Associate P.J., JACKSON and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
**1 Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger was convicted 
of one count of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute and one count of 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Rothlisberger 
now argues that the trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony of Monticello Police Chief Kent Adair 
(Chief Adair) as lay witness testimony, and that the 
State therefore erred by failing to provide thirty 
days notice of that testimony as required by Utah 
Code Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI 
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BACKGROUND 
**2 On September 24, 2002, Tonya Althoff and 
Rothlisberger were pulled over while returning to 
Utah after a brief trip to Arizona. Officer Jim 
Eberling (Officer Eberling) initially pulled the pah-
over after observing an improper lane change. At 
the time of the stop, Althoff was driving the car and 
Rothlisberger was sitting in the front passenger 
seat. A subsequent search of police records by 
Officer Eberling revealed that the license plates on 
the car had expired and that Althoff s driver license 
had been suspended. Because of this, Althoff was 
removed from the vehicle and placed under arrest. 
**3 After Althoff had been handcuffed and placed 
in Officer Eberling's car, Officer Eberling 
conducted a search of the vehicle. During this 
search, Officer Eberling discovered a small plastic 
bag containing methamphetamine that was located 
in plain view on the console between the two front 
seats. Sometime during this initial phase of the 
*1195 search, Chief Adair arrived on the scene. 
Due to the discovery of the small plastic bag 
containing methamphetamine on the front console, 
the officers placed Rothlisberger under arrest and 
continued with their search of the car. During this 
search, Chief Adair noticed that Rothlisberger had 
acted very nervous while Officer Eberling was 
searching in the area of the front passenger seat. 
Based on Rothlisberger's behavior, Chief Adair 
instructed Officer Eberling to focus on the 
passenger side of the car. Further search led to the 
discovery of a pair of men's pants that had been 
stuffed into the passenger's side door panel. Inside 
of the pants was a small plastic bag, placed inside of 
a toilet paper roll, that contained what was later 
shown to be thirty-two grams of methamphetamine. 
The officers also found a snort tube with the pair of 
pants. The snort tube was covered with a white 
residue that was later identified as 
methamphetamine. During the further search of the 
vehicle, the officers also found a gym bag in the 
trunk that contained drug scales, covered in white 
residue, and several small plastic bags. 
**4 After being given the Miranda warnings, 
Rothlisberger admitted to officers that the pants 
found stuffed in the passenger side door were his. 
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Rothlisberger also admitted that the snort tube was 
his. Rothlisberger further admitted to having used 
methamphetamine before leaving Arizona earlier 
that morning. After being given the Miranda 
warnings, Althoff claimed that the gym bag found in 
the trunk was hers. She also claimed that the 
methamphetamine found in the car was hers, and 
that Rothlisberger had no knowledge of it. 
**5 On September 26, 2002, Rothlisberger was 
charged with one count of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 
58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (2003), and one count of 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated section 58-37a-5(l) (2003). 
[FN1] On December 2, 2002, Rothlisberger 
appeared before the district court for his 
preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, 
Officer Eberling testified regarding the significance 
of the quantity of drugs found in Rothlisberger's 
pair of pants. Officer Eberling specifically testified 
that the drugs found in the pants were of such large 
quantity that it was likely that the drugs were 
intended for further sale. Though Chief Adair also 
testified at the preliminary hearing regarding his 
participation in the arrest, he did not offer any 
testimony at the preliminary hearing regarding the 
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine 
found in Rothlisberger's pants. 
FN1. Althoff was also charged with 
various criminal counts arising out of this 
same incident. Her subsequent trial and 
convictions, however, are not before us as 
part of this appeal. 
**6 At trial, however, the prosecutor did not ask 
Officer Eberling to offer his opinion regarding the 
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine 
found in Rothlisberger's pants. Instead, questions 
regarding the significance of the quantity were now 
directed toward Chief Adair. The following 
colloquies occurred during Chief Adair's direct 
examination: 
Q: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in your 
experience to look or see how methamphetamine 
is usually packaged as far as~when you have 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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found methamphetamine in your experience, have 
you found times when people have had personal 
use amounts? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How is it usually packaged or what is the 
quantity? 
A: A quarter or half grams, right in there. Maybe 
even at the most a gram. 
Q: Do you have-through your training and 
experience, do you know commonly what 
somebody would buy if they were to go out on 
the street buy some right now, what would they 
usually get for personal use? 
A: I don't understand the question. What do you 
mean what would they usually get? 
Q: Well, if I -
A: Are you talking the quantity? 
Q: Yes. 
*1196 A: In our undercover investigations when 
we buy from individuals, we usually buy a quarter 
or a half a gram. 
Q: Have you ever found in your experience that 
someone who had personal quantities of 
methamphetamine to have scales? 
A: It's not common, no. 
**7 Defense attorneys objected to Chief Adair's 
testimony, arguing that it should be deemed expert 
testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and accordingly that admission of that 
expert testimony was improper because the State 
had not given the defense thirty-days notice of the 
expert testimony as required by Utah Code 
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). The trial court 
overruled this objection, ruling that Chief Adair's 
testimony was admissible as lay witness testimony 
under rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
**8 On February 11, 2003, Rothlisberger was 
found guilty on both counts. He now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**9 Rothlisberger argues that the trial court erred 
in admitting Chief Adair's testimony regarding the 
significance of the quantity of methamphetamine 
found in Rothlisberger's pants. We review 
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decisions relating to the qualification of a witness as 
an expert or as a lay witness for an abuse of 
discretion. See Hardy v. Hardy, 116 P.2d 917, 925 
(UtahCt.App.1989). [FN2] 
FN2. Rothlisberger also argues that the 
State's pretrial failure to notify him of 
Chief Adair's potential testimony violated 
rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Because we hold that reversal 
is warranted due to the State's failure to 
comply with Utah Code Annotated section 
77-17-13 (2003), we need not reach the 
merits of this separate claim. 
ANALYSIS 
[1] **10 Under Utah Code Annotated section 
77-17-13(l)(a) (2003), "[i]f the prosecution or the 
defense intends to call any expert to testify in a 
felony case at trial ... the party intending to call the 
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as 
soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before 
trial." Rothlisberger argues that Chief Adair's 
testimony regarding the significance of the amount 
of methamphetamine found with his pants was 
expert testimony, and that the State's failure to give 
him thirty-days notice of that testimony warrants 
reversal. We agree. 
**11 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, lay 
witness testimony is defined as testimony that is 
"rationally based on the perception of the witness," 
Utah R. Evid. 701, while expert testimony is 
testimony that is based on "scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge." Utah R. Evid. 702. 
There have been multiple Utah cases that have 
discussed the question of whether a witness may be 
classified as an expert for the purposes of testifying 
about a particular subject. See, e.g., Smith v. Grand 
Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,1 25, 84 
P.3d 1154; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115,1 
1 52-86, 61 P.3d 1068. The question before us 
today, however, is not whether the State could have 
offered expert testimony regarding this subject, but 
rather whether that subject is so specialized that the 
State must first qualify its witness as an expert 
before the trial court can properly admit testimonial 
opinion regarding it. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI 
Page 4 
**12 The State contends that this subject was 
resolved by the opinion of our supreme court in 
State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987). In Ellis, 
one of the issues before the court was whether a lay 
witness could be allowed to offer his opinion that 
two separate footprints that were found at the scene 
of a crime came from the same shoe. See id. at 190. 
In ruling that such testimony was admissible as lay 
witness testimony, our supreme court held that 
[s]imply because a question might be capable of 
scientific determination, helpful lay testimony 
touching on the issue and based on personal 
observation does not become expert opinion. It is 
true that "if [a question] is capable of scientific 
determination, then expert testimony is 
admissible with respect to it"; however, that does 
not mean that lay opinion testimony is prohibited 
if the provisions of the evidentiary rule are met. 
*1197 Id. at 191 (citation omitted) (alterations in 
original). 
**13 Contrary to the State's assertions, we do not 
think that Ellis is directly controlling here. In 
affirming the trial court's conclusion that the 
challenged testimony was lay testimony, the Ellis 
court simply concluded that though the subject of 
footprint comparison might be a subject about 
which experts could testify, the challenged 
testimony itself did not automatically meet the 
definitional standards for expert testimony. Left 
unresolved in Ellis, however, was the question of 
whether there are certain other subjects that should 
be considered so intrinsically specialized that a 
witness could not testify regarding them without 
relying on the types of "scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge" that are characteristic 
of expert testimony under rule 702. [FN3] 
FN3. It is worth noting that under Ellis's 
express terms the State would not have 
been prevented from calling an expert 
witness in footprint identification to further 
bolster its case before the jury, nor would 
the State have been prevented from 
attempting to bolster that very witness's 
own credibility by attempting to qualify 
him as an expert in footprint identification 
or forensic investigation. 
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**14 To date, there has been no Utah decision that 
has directly addressed the question of whether a 
witness must be characterized as an expert in order 
to testify about a particular subject. In 
circumstances in which Utah courts have not 
definitively addressed an issue, it is appropriate for 
us to turn to decisions and commentators that 
interpret the related federal rules for guidance. See 
State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120,f 33 n. 5, 63 P.3d 72 
**15 Our review of the related federal cases 
indicates that the question of whether a person must 
be designated as an expert to testify regarding a 
particular subject is one that has been the subject of 
much disagreement among the federal courts. Some 
courts have taken a narrow interpretive approach to 
this question, holding that a witness whose 
testimony could be admitted as expert testimony 
under rule 702 must be admitted as an expert in 
order to testify regarding that subject. In Randolph 
v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844 (10th 
Cir.1979), for example, the Tenth Circuit held that a 
lay witness is not permitted to "express an opinion 
as to matters which are beyond the realm of 
common experience and which require the special 
skill and knowledge of an expert witness." Id. at 
846. This bright line rule was similarly emphasized 
by the Fourth Circuit in Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd's, London v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200 (4th 
Cir.2000), wherein the court held that rule 701 does 
not permit lay witnesses to testify about matters that 
are necessarily predicated on "some specialized 
knowledge or skill or education that is not in the 
possession of the jurors." Id. at 203 (quotations and 
citation omitted). In this manner, courts that have 
adopted this narrow interpretive approach have 
essentially concluded that the definitional boundary 
separating rule 701 lay testimony from rule 702 
expert testimony should be carefiilly observed. In 
essence, courts following this approach hold that 
while lay witnesses are allowed to testify regarding 
their direct perceptions of the events in question, 
opinions or inferences that are reliant on "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge" are 
necessarily excluded unless the witness is first 
qualified as an expert. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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**16 Other federal courts have favored a more 
liberal interpretive approach to the question at hand. 
The Fifth Circuit, for example, has clearly held that 
lay witness testimony may include opinions that are 
predicated on "specialized knowledge," as long as 
that testimony is rationally based on the "personal 
perception" of the witness. United States v. Riddle, 
103 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir.1997). Thus, in Soden 
v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.1983), 
the court held that a mechanic was allowed to testify 
as a lay witness regarding his conclusion that a 
particular design defect was not only dangerous, but 
also the likely cause of a series of accidents. See id. 
at 510-12. In holding that the testimony was 
admissible as lay witness testimony, the court 
emphasized that the mechanic's testimony was 
based on his own personal observations of the 
involved trucks, see id. at 511-12, and that the 
opinions that he offered were "rationally" related 
*1198 to those personal observations. Id. at 512. 
The court thus emphasized that though the witness's 
testimony "did constitute an opinion which might 
have better been given by one more formally an 
expert," its "strong basis both in his observation and 
in his experience" rendered it a subject about which 
lay testimony could appropriately be offered. Id. 
**17 Various other federal courts have followed 
this more liberal interpretive approach. For 
example, the Eighth Circuit held that "four 
executives of railroads" were allowed to testify 
"that, in their experience, trains with cabooses were 
no safer than cabooseless trains." Burlington N. 
RR. Co. v. Nebraska, 802 F.2d 994, 1004 (8th 
Cir.1986). According to the Burlington N. RR. Co. 
court, this testimony was appropriately 
characterized as lay witness testimony because it 
was based on the executives' own "personal 
experiences." Id. Similar results were reached in 
such cases as United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 
1131, 1145 (7th Cir.1982), and United States v. 
VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.1995). 
**18 The more liberal interpretive approach has, 
however, been the subject of some criticism. One 
respected commentator has written that "many 
courts expanded the admissibility of lay opinion and 
inference testimony beyond Rule 701's primary 
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purpose, thereby permitting lay opinion testimony 
to encroach on Rule 702's province." 4 Joseph M. 
McLaughlin et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 
701.03 [4] [b] (2d ed.2004). This same commentator 
further wrote that "[i]n some instances, it has been 
difficult to discern from the court's opinions why 
the admissible 'lay opinion testimony' was not, in 
fact, 'expert opinion testimony.' " Id. Certain federal 
courts have been similarly critical of the liberal 
approach. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has 
recently noted that the liberal approach would 
potentially allow parties to evade the strictures of 
the expert qualification process by simply 
characterizing their expert witnesses as lay 
witnesses. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair 
Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1222 
(llthCir.2003). 
**19 These concerns appear to have been shared 
by the drafters of the federal rules. Indeed, the 
2000 amendment to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence appears to have been expressly drafted for 
the purpose of closing this erstwhile loophole. 
Before the amendment, rules 701 and 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were silent on the issue 
of whether lay witnesses were allowed to offer 
opinions on certain subjects that would normally 
require specialized knowledge. The 2000 
amendment to rule 701 changed this, however, with 
the rule now expressly declaring that lay witnesses 
are not allowed to offer testimony that is "based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702." Explaining the 
purpose of this amendment, the advisory committee 
notes to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
expressly state that "[r]ule 701 has been amended to 
eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements 
set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the 
simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay 
witness clothing." The advisory committee notes 
further state that 
[t]he amendment does not distinguish between 
expert and lay witnesses, but rather between 
expert and lay testimony. Certainly it is possible 
for the same witness to provide both lay and 
expert testimony in a single case. The 
amendment makes clear that any part of a 
witnesses] testimony that is based upon scientific 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI 
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technical, or other specialized knowledge within 
the scope of Rule 702 is governed by the 
standards of Rule 702 and the corresponding 
disclosure requirements of the Civil and Criminal 
Rules. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
[2] **20 After considering the different 
approaches to this question, we are persuaded that 
the narrow interpretive approach embodied by the 
2000 amendment to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is the correct approach to follow in 
interpreting our own rules of evidence. When 
confronted with questions of rule-based or statutory 
interpretation, we endeavor to interpret the rules 
and statutes in such a manner so as to give full 
meaning and effect to all of the involved provisions. 
Here, adopting the open-ended approach discussed 
above would not only blur the distinction between 
rules 701 and *1199 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, but would also create the very real danger 
that parties might impermissibly seek to avoid the 
reliability and reporting requirements required 
under our law by merely engaging in games of 
semantics. To avoid opening the door for such 
results, we think it clear that when a witness seeks 
to testify regarding matters that are necessarily 
based on that witness's "scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge," that witness must be 
qualified as an expert under rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, and all reliability, reporting, or 
otherwise applicable statutory commands must then 
be followed with respect to that testimony. [FN4] 
FN4. In State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 
(Utah 1996), our supreme court noted that 
"when a new rule ... constitutes a clear 
break with the past, it is not generally 
applied retroactively." Id. at 354. This is 
particularly so where a retroactive 
application would impair our efforts to 
"maintain[ ] the efficient administration of 
justice." Id. 
We recognize here that our interpretation 
of rules 701 and 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence settles a question for which there 
had been little prior guidance from Utah 
appellate courts. We further recognize that 
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this issue is likely the subject of some 
dispute in many cases that are currently 
before our various courts. In order to 
maintain the efficient administration of 
justice, we accordingly hold that today's 
opinion should only be applied 
prospectively, and that any decisions 
relating to this question that were entered 
prior to today's holding should not be 
reversed thereby. 
**21 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States 
v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir.1997), 
is instructive. In Figueroa-Lopez, the defendant 
was charged with various counts relating to an 
illegal drug transaction. See id at 1242. At trial, 
various federal agents who were involved in the 
surveillance of the defendant testified regarding the 
events leading up to the arrest. See id. One agent, 
testifying as a lay witness, asserted that the 
defendant had engaged in "countersurveillance" 
activities that were "common practice for narcotics 
dealers" and that the defendant's use of a rental car 
was also "a common practice for narcotics dealers." 
Id at 1243. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit overruled 
the trial court's conclusions that the testimony was 
properly admissible as lay witness testimony. See 
id. at 1246. In so ruling, the appellate court found 
that the testimony was necessarily predicated on 
"demonstrable expertise" in the area of law 
enforcement, id, and that the subjects about which 
the agent testified were therefore not "common 
enough" to be the subject of lay witness testimony. 
Id at 1245. Responding to the government's 
argument that the testimony was admissible as lay 
witness testimony due to its reliance on the agent's 
own personal observations, the court noted that the 
government's argument would "simply blur[ ] the 
distinction between Federal Rules of Evidence 701 
and 702.... A holding to the contrary would simply 
encourage the Government to offer all kinds of 
specialized opinions without pausing first properly 
to establish the required qualifications of their 
witnesses." Id at 1246. 
**22 Importantly, the Figueroa-Lopez court then 
identified portions of another agent's testimony that 
were properly admissible as lay witness testimony. 
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Noting that one of the agents had testified regarding 
the "suspicious" nature of the defendant's conduct, 
the court expressly held that opinions regarding 
whether a person is acting suspiciously are 
"common enough" to be admissible as lay witness 
testimony. Id. at 1246. The decision in 
Figueroa-Lopez therefore provides an example of 
how the rules do "not distinguish between expert 
and lay witnesses, but rather between expert and lay 
testimony." Fed R. Evid. 701 advisory committee 
notes. Thus, it is "[c]ertainly ... possible for the 
same witness to provide both lay and expert 
testimony in a single case." Id. 
**23 The question before us in the present case, 
then, is whether Chief Adair's testimony regarding 
the significance of the quantity of 
methamphetamine found in Rothlisberger's pants 
was the type of testimony that was necessarily based 
on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge. We hold that it was. 
[3] **24 It is well settled that witnesses can be 
qualified as experts not only on the basis of formal 
educational training, but also on the basis of their 
own personal or vocational experiences. See, e.g., 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,1 15, 1 P.3d 546; 
mOORandle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 
1993). In State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986), for example, our supreme court held that a 
witness's prior experience as a "user and seller" of 
drugs qualified him to testify as an expert on "the 
current drug culture." Id at 420. Similarly, in 
Randle, our supreme court held that a witness could 
be qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction 
by virtue of his practical experience dealing with 
such matters. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1337. 
**25 There have been no Utah cases that have 
specifically addressed the question of whether 
knowledge of the significance of a particular 
quantity of an illegal drug should be regarded as 
specialized knowledge about which a witness must 
be qualified as an expert in order to testify. The 
Tenth Circuit, however, has specifically addressed 
this question and has definitively concluded that 
such knowledge should be regarded as specialized 
knowledge. In United States v. McDonald, 933 
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F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.1991), the court noted that the 
"[defendant possessed 6.7 grams of rock cocaine." 
Id. at 1522. The court then concluded that "[a] 
person possessing no knowledge of the drug world 
would find the importance of this fact impossible to 
understand. The average juror would not know 
whether this quantity is a mere trace, or sufficient to 
pollute 1000 people." Id. In United States v. 
Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir.1994), the court 
similarly held that "a veteran police officer" 
testified from "specialized knowledge" when he 
testified that a particular amount of cocaine would 
likely be "for distribution and not for personal use." 
Id. at 1338. 
[4] **26 We agree with the Tenth Circuit's 
assessment of this question. In our view, 
knowledge regarding the significance of a particular 
quantity of drug is "beyond the realm of common 
experience" for the common juror, Randolph, 590 
F.2d at 846, and is accordingly the type of 
testimony that a witness could offer only if first 
qualified as an expert. [FN5] Applied to the present 
case, Chief Adair was clearly permitted to offer lay 
witness testimony regarding the events leading up to 
Rothlisberger's arrest. Chief Adair was further 
permitted to offer testimony that was rationally 
derived from his perceptions of the events on that 
day. Such testimony could also have included any 
opinions relating to any matters arising therefrom 
that would have been within the common 
experience of a common citizen. The State was not 
permitted, however, to elicit any opinions or 
conclusions from Chief Adair that were necessarily 
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge, without first seeking to qualify him as 
an expert witness under *1201 rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The testimony from Chief Adah-
based on his specialized knowledge was therefore 
permissible only upon compliance with all 
applicable laws and rules relating to expert 
testimony. Because the trial court allowed Chief 
Adair to testify as a lay witness regarding these 
matters, we thus necessarily conclude that the court 
abused its discretion. [FN6] 
FN5. The State argues that, under the 
terms of our decision in Provo City Corp. 
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v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
, we should reach a different result on this 
question. In Spotts, we held that a lay 
witness was permitted to testify regarding 
the identity of a particular drug. See id. at 
442-43. In reaching that conclusion, we 
"emphasize[d] that [the] case involved not 
only the substance's smell, but also 
simultaneous observation of the smoke 
exiting defendant's mouth and prior 
observation of the act of taking 'hits' from 
a 'joint.' " Id. at 443. In our view, the result 
in Spotts was necessarily predicated on our 
recognition of the degree to which certain 
drugs have permeated our society. 
Because of this proliferation, knowledge of 
the appearance, smell, and resultant 
physical effects of certain substances can 
unfortunately be considered common 
knowledge in our society. Our decision in 
Spotts implicitly acknowledged this sad 
state of affairs, and thus appropriately held 
that opinions regarding the identity of 
particular substances can be the subject of 
lay testimony. The question before us 
here, however, does not deal with the 
common juror's ability to merely identify a 
particular substance, but instead deals with 
the common juror's ability to identify 
whether a particular quantity of an illegal 
substance is so large that it would likely be 
used for future sale. By definition, the 
only persons having such knowledge 
would be those who are either actually 
involved in the sale of illegal substances, 
or those who are involved in law 
enforcement's efforts to curb such sales. 
Either way, this knowledge must be 
regarded as specialized, and testimony that 
is based on that knowledge would 
therefore appropriately be characterized as 
expert testimony. 
Notably, a similar result was emphasized 
by the federal rules advisory committee. 
As noted in the advisory committee notes 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, 
testimony 
that a substance appeared to be a narcotic 
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.... is not based on specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702, but rather is 
based upon a layperson's personal 
knowledge. If, however, that witness were 
to describe how a narcotic was 
manufactured, or to describe the intricate 
workings of a narcotic distribution 
network, then the witness would have to 
qualify as an expert under Rule 702. 
Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note. 
FN6. After the conclusion of the trial, the 
trial court was asked to reconsider its prior 
ruling regarding the nature of Chief Adair's 
testimony. In this post-trial ruling, the 
court held that Chief Adair's testimony 
"actually turned out to be neither expert 
testimony or lay opinion testimony, but 
merely testimony about Adair's actual 
experiences." In support of that 
conclusion, the court noted that Chief 
Adair had not actually offered a direct 
opinion as to whether the quantity of 
methamphetamine that was found in 
Rothlisberger's pants was a saleable 
quantity, but that Chief Adair had instead 
simply testified in general terms regarding 
the significance of such quantities in his 
past experiences. The State thus argues 
that we should alternatively affirm the 
rulings below on the basis of this post-trial 
ruling. We disagree. 
The trial court may have been technically 
correct in noting that Chief Adair did not 
offer a direct opinion as to whether 
Rothlisberger had the intent to distribute 
illegal drugs. As noted by the trial court, it 
does appear that the questions relating to 
the significance of various quantities of 
illegal drugs were framed with reference to 
Chief Adair's past experiences, and that 
Chief Adair was never directly asked how 
the quantity of methamphetamine that was 
found in Rothlisberger's possession 
comported with those prior experiences. 
The State's failure to elicit such direct, 
case-specific opinion testimony does not 
mean, however, that Chief Adair's 
testimony should not still be regarded as 
expert testimony. Rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence specifically states that 
an expert who testified "by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education 
may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise" (Emphasis added.) 
Under its express terms, the rule therefore 
contemplates that non-opinion testimony 
can still be qualified as expert testimony if 
it is based on specialized knowledge or 
experience. One example of non-opinion 
expert testimony is then specifically 
referred to in rule 703 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which states that expert 
testimony may be admitted in the form of 
"an opinion or inference." We think it 
plain that, in the present circumstances, 
Chief Adair's testimony was certainly 
intended to create the inference that the 
thirty-two grams of methamphetamine 
found in Rothlisberger's pants were of 
such a large quantity that an intent to 
distribute could be inferred. Cf. State v. 
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 1985) 
(noting that the quantity of an illegal 
substance can be used as evidence of an 
intent to distribute); State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1983) (same). 
As such, the trial court erred in its 
conclusion that Chief Adair's failure to 
offer a direct opinion as to the meaning of 
this particular evidence rendered his 
testimony admissible as non-expert 
testimony. 
**27 Having concluded that the trial court abused 
its discretion in characterizing Chief Adair's 
testimony as lay witness testimony, we can readily 
conclude that the State was required to comply with 
the notice requirements for expert witnesses 
contained in Utah Code Annotated section 77-17-13 
(2003). Under section 77-17-13(l)(a), the State was 
required to provide Rothlisberger with thirty-days 
notice that it intended to offer Chief Adair as an 
expert witness; section 77-17-13(l)(b) specifically 
requires that notice to include 
the name and address of [Chief Adair], [Chief 
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Adair]'s curriculum vitae, and one of the 
following: 
(i) a copy of [Chief Adair]'s report, if one exists; 
or 
(ii) a written explanation of [Chief Adair]'s 
proposed testimony sufficient to give the 
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet 
the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to 
cooperatively consult with the opposing party on 
reasonable notice. 
**28 The State argues that, even if we conclude 
that Chief Adair's testimony constituted expert 
testimony, compliance with section 77-17-13 was 
still not required for two reasons. First, the State 
argues that Rothlisberger's failure to request a 
continuance acted as a waiver of his right to notice. 
Second, the State argues that Rothlisberger was 
given notice of the proposed testimony by virtue of 
the similar testimony that was offered by Officer 
Eberling at the preliminary hearing. We disagree. 
[5][6] **29 It is generally true that, when a party 
is confronted with surprise expert testimony at trial, 
a failure to request a continuance acts as a waiver of 
the right to challenge the admission of that 
testimony. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211,1 
37, 52 P.3d 451 ("When the prosecution introduces 
unexpected testimony, a defendant 'essentially 
*1202 waives his right to later claim error' if the 
defendant fails to request a continuance or seek 
other appropriate relief under Rule 16(g) [of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]." (Quoting 
State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 
415, 418 (Utah 1989)).)). In contrast to the waiver 
cases cited by the State, however, the situation 
before us is not one in which the defendant failed to 
request a continuance upon being presented with 
surprise expert testimony. Rather, this is a situation 
in which, after receiving the appropriate objection 
from the defendant, the trial court expressly 
determined that the challenged testimony was not 
expert testimony, but that it was instead admissible 
as lay witness testimony. As discussed above, we 
have determined that that ruling was in error. As a 
result of the trial court's ruling, however, the 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No CI 
Page 10 
mandatory continuance provisions of section 
77-17-13(4)(a) would have necessarily been 
deemed inapplicable, insofar as there was no 
court-recognized expert testimony being offered. In 
essence, the trial court's ruling that the testimony 
was lay witness testimony rendered any objection 
that was predicated on expert-testimony rules futile. 
Under our law, parties are not required to make 
futile objections in order to preserve a future claim. 
See Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286,flf 13, 
16, 76 P.3d 1170. Thus, because the trial court first 
erred by concluding that the challenged testimony 
was admissible as lay witness testimony, we cannot 
say that Rothlisberger waived his right to 
challenge the admission of that testimony by then 
failing to request a continuance under section 
77-17-13(4)(a). 
[7] **30 Next, section 77-17-13(5)(a) provides 
that "testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing 
... constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's 
qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed 
trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to 
by the expert at the preliminary hearing." We 
disagree with the State's suggestion, however, that 
the testimony of Officer Eberling at the preliminary 
hearing provided Rothlisberger with notice of the 
similar testimony that was ultimately offered by 
Chief Adair at trial. Under the terms of section 
77-17-13(l)(b), a party who is seeking to offer 
expert testimony must first provide the other party 
with a copy of the expert's name, address, and 
curriculum vitae. This clearly contemplates that the 
opposing party will have the opportunity to prepare 
for that expert's testimony in a witness-specific 
fashion. See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 
1023 (Utah 1994) (holding that one of the 
"significant purposes" of pretrial witness disclosure 
rules is to provide the opposing party with the 
opportunity to "investigate] the witnesses] 
testimony" and "preparje] an effective 
cross-examination"). In State v. Tolano, 2001 UT 
App 37, 19 P.3d 400, we held that the notice 
provision of section 77-17-13(5)(a) is only satisfied 
where a witness personally testifies at the 
preliminary hearing; otherwise, the opposing party 
would not have the time to "prepare to meet [the] 
adverse expert testimony." Id. at f 18 (quotations 
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and citation omitted). 
[8] **31 Here, Officer Eberling's testimony at the 
preliminary hearing did not provide Rothlisberger 
with the proper opportunity to prepare for Chief 
Adair's expert testimony. Though the testimonies of 
the two officers might ultimately have been similar 
in content, it is nevertheless clear that the State's 
failure to provide notice of Chief Adair's potential 
expert testimony at trial deprived Rothlisberger of 
the notice that he would need to prepare a 
witness-specific response to that testimony. Thus, 
because Chief Adair failed to testify as an expert at 
the preliminary hearing, the State's failure to 
provide Rothlisberger with notice of his testimony 
constituted a violation of section 77-17-13(5)(a). 
Inasmuch as that testimony was central to the 
Possession with Intent to Distribute charge, we 
accordingly reverse Rothlisberger's conviction. 
[FN7] 
FN7. Rothlisberger also argues (i) that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion for a 
directed verdict; (ii) that the trial court 
erred in overruling his objection to various 
statements made by the prosecutor in his 
closing statement; and (iii) that the trial 
court erred by failing to instruct the jury on 
the alternate reasonable hypotheses of 
innocence. Because we have already 
determined that a new trial is warranted 
with respect to Rothlisberger's conviction 
for Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute, we need not 
address these arguments with respect to 
that charge. 
With respect to Rothlisberger's arguments 
relating to his conviction for Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia, we conclude that 
reversal is not warranted. As noted above, 
Rothlisberger admitted to the officers that 
the snort tube that was found in the car was 
his. Rothlisberger has not contested the 
admissibility of that admission before this 
court, nor has he argued that the snort tube 
does not constitute drug paraphernalia 
under Utah Code Annotated section 
58-37a-3 (2002). As such, we can readily 
conclude that the court did not err in 
denying his motion for a directed verdict 
on that charge. We can further conclude 
that any error that the court might have 
made with respect to the rulings regarding 
either the prosecutor's closing statements 
or the alternate reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence doctrine was harmless. 
Accordingly, Rothlisberger's conviction 
for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia is 
affirmed. 
*1203 CONCLUSION 
**32 We conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it allowed Chief Adair to testify as 
a lay witness about the significance of various 
quantities of methamphetamine. Because the State 
failed to give Rothlisberger thirty-days notice of 
that testimony as required by Utah Code Annotated 
section 77-17-13 (2003), we reverse 
Rothlisberger's conviction for Possession with 
Intent to Distribute and remand for a new trial on 
that charge. 
**331 CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
**34 I DISSENT: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
95 P.3d 1193, 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2004 UT 
App 226 
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Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
THORNE, Judge: 
*1 Toyna Althoff appeals her conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to distribute, as well as her associated convictions 
for possession of drug paraphernalia and various 
traffic related crimes. We reverse. 
Althoff s arrest, conviction, and appeal mirror those 
of her companion at the time of her arrest, Thomas 
Kevin Rothlisberger. See State v. Rothlisberger, 
2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d 1193, cert granted, 
2004 Utah LEXIS 248 (Utah Nov. 24, 2004). 
Moreover, she presents an issue that is identical to 
the issue central to our decision in Rothlisberger, 
namely, whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
recognize that a portion of Chief Adair's testimony 
was expert testimony and, if so, whether Althoff s 
right to notice of the nature of Adair's testimony and 
his background was violated. See id. at 1fl[ 10-27. 
Having decided in Rothlisberger, under identical 
circumstances, that the trial court's decision was 
improper, and that the State failed to comply with 
the requirements of Utah Code section 77-17-13 
(2003), we are compelled to follow that decision 
here. See State v. Simms, 881 P.2d 840, 843 n.7 
(Utah 1994) ("Stare decisis requires that a decision 
rendered by a court in a particular factual context 
govern later decisions by that court arising under 
the same or similar facts."). 
Accordingly, we reverse Althoffs convictions and 
remand this case for a new trial. [FN1] 
FN1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted 
the State's petition for certiorari in State v. 
Rothlisberger. See 2004 UT App 226, 95 
P.3d 1193, cert, granted, 2004 Utah 
LEXIS 248 (Utah Nov. 24, 2004). 
Assuming that the State's dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of the instant case 
mirrors its position in Rothlisberer, we 
encourage it to move for consolidation of 
the two cases. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, and 
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 375089 (Utah 
App.), 2005 UT App 69 
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